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Abstract
Using a unique database of 990 VC-backed Belgian firms and a complete population
of SMEs in Belgium, we investigate the differences in the return generating process in
the venture capital-baked firms and their peers that operate without venture capital
financing. Focusing on regular financial returns, we analyze the extent to which the
presence of a venture capital investor affects the sensitivity of VC-backed firm’s returns
to the changes in capital structure, in operating cycle, and in the industry dynamics.
The differences may occur from the self-/selection of better companies into venture
capital portfolios, from venture capitalists’ value-adding activities, and/or from both.
We examine them in the context of complex simulation procedure with allows sepa-
rating selection from value-adding when other traditional approaches are difficult to
implement. Our results indicate that venture capital-backed firms are able to extract
more rent from the changing industry conditions, and from the optimizations in capital
structure and financing choices. The presence of the venture capitalists in the equity
of the firm seem to have only a marginal effect on operating cycle efficiency. Overall
the results are suggestive of the value-adding being the main driver for the VC-backed
firm performance.
Keywords: Venture Capital; Performance; Simulation; Value-adding; Selection.
JEL classification: L22, L25, M13, G30
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1 Introduction1
Venture capital and private equity (VC/PE) performance is often justified by two non-2
exclusive features associated with this type of financing: selection and value-adding (Macmil-3
lan et al., 1987; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza, 1992; Brander et al.,4
2002; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Selection means that venture capitalists (VCs), espe-5
cially more experienced and reputable ones, can invest into better quality targets with6
higher growth prospects (Sørensen, 2007).1 Value-adding relates to the active involvement7
of VCs in the ventures they fund (Sapienza et al., 1994; de Clercq and Manigart, 2007).8
Previous studies assert that VCs closely monitor, control, and manage their investments9
(Gompers, 1995; Davila and Foster, 2003; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). To protect themselves10
from the management moral hazard issues, they write highly sophisticated contracts and11
design efficient covenants (Gompers and Lerner, 1996; Hellmann, 1998; Kaplan and Ström-12
berg, 2004). To enhance operations of their targets, VCs make use of their large networks of13
potential clients and customers (Hochberg et al., 2007). Finally, they are able to assist their14
targets in strategic and (if needed) operational management, senior personnel recruitment,15
and additional financing arrangements (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Macmillan et al., 1989;16
Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1994, 1996; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Cumming et al., 2005;17
Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; de Clercq and Manigart, 2007).18
Clearly, both selection and value-adding interact, which makes it difficult to separate19
the relative importance of each of these factors. This problem is particularly relevant20
for the comparison between the performance of venture capital-backed (VC-backed) firms21
with their non-VC-backed peers. Essentially, selection of better targets by a VC implies22
that her presence becomes endogenous to performance. The endogeneity occurs because23
1Scholars also documented that prospective entrepreneurial firms may self-select themselves into a better
VCs (Hsu, 2004).
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firms, which end up with venture capital financing, are inherently better along a number24
of unobserved characteristics than firms, which operate without venture capital support25
(Sørensen, 2007). Accounting for this, previous studies investigated the impact of venture26
capital on the innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000), on the probability of IPO (Sørensen,27
2007), on the financial returns at a fund level (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005), and on the28
round-to-round/pre-IPO returns at the individual investment level (Cochrane, 2005; Hand,29
2007).30
This paper analyzes the impact of the VC’s presence on the determinants of regular31
financial performance at the portfolio firm level. The extant literature on the determi-32
nants of financial performance of VC-backed firms isolate three relevant elements: capital33
structure, operating cycle, and industry dynamics (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Gorman and34
Sahlman, 1989; Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Baeyens and Manigart, 2003; Bottazzi et al.,35
2008b). Our central assumption is that the interaction between selection and value-adding36
explicitly magnifies the effects of these elements. The main challenge, however, is the37
separation of selection from value-adding. To solve this issue, previous literature exten-38
sively used instrumental variable approach (like in Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan39
and Schoar (2005)) or Heckman’s2 sample selection models (like in Sørensen (2007) and40
Cochrane (2005)). These methods, however, require either exogenous and relevant instru-41
ments or the information on investor characteristics. Unfortunately, the nature of our data42
do not allow the use of these approaches. Instead, we are able to match VC-backed firms43
with the whole population of small and medium sized firms that operate without VC financ-44
ing. Consequently, we develop a framework that separates selection from value-adding and45
quantifies the magnitude of the impact of VC’s presence on the return determinants. Our46
main research question is therefore formulated as follows: how does selection and value-47
2See Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979).
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adding by a VC impact on the return generating process of underlying portfolio firms?48
Specifically, we investigate the extent to which the presence of a venture capital investor49
affects the sensitivity of VC-backed firm’s returns to the changes in capital structure, in50
operating cycle, and in the industry dynamics.51
The analysis exploits two raw datasets. The first set is a unique hand-collected sample52
of Belgian VC-backed companies, which received financing during 1998-2007. These data53
come from various secondary sources, like press-releases, funds’ annual reports and web54
sites, and news databases. The second set is a complete population of Belgian firms over55
the same period. The disclosure of the standardized financial statements is mandatory for56
all firms operating in Belgium. Thus, the data are deemed to be reliable and homogeneous.57
Using the population we match VC-backed firms with their comparable peers and randomly58
permutate both sets.3 We then run our models on the original and permutated samples and59
store results. This procedure is repeated in a simulation setting, which ultimately allows60
us to trace the empirical distributions of the return determinants’ loadings.61
Consistent with the evidence on the VC’s value-adding, our findings indicate that the62
presence of VCs among the shareholders of an underlying portfolio firm increases the sensi-63
tivity of its regular financial returns to changes in its determinants. Moreover, these shifts64
are likely to be independent of selection. Specifically, returns of the VC-backed firms react65
much faster to the changes in capital structure, and to the changes in industry dynamics,66
compared to their non-VC-backed peers. The changes in the operating cycle seem to have a67
very close effect on the future performance of the VC-backed firms and their peers. Finally,68
returns of VC-backed firms seem to be nonlinear in their determinants, and these nonlin-69
earities are exaggerated by the presence of venture capital investor. These findings suggest70
that VCs add the most of the value in the capital structure management and managerial71




The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical73
reasoning of this paper. Section 3 presents the data and research design. Section 4 outlines74
the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.75
2 VCs’ selection, value-adding, and performance76
Entrepreneurial firms often face difficulties in obtaining external financing (Gompers and77
Lerner, 2001). They are typically characterized by high levels of information asymmetry,78
operate in highly uncertain environments, and have very few tangible assets. Because79
of this, traditional fund providers, such as banks, may be reluctant to provide financing80
to these businesses (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Frequently,81
though, such firms have high growth prospects and can potentially yield handsome returns82
to investors. As such, venture capitalists invest in these firms to benefit from this perceived83
growth and return potential.84
VCs excel in "picking winners" and reducing information gaps around entrepreneurial85
firms (Baum and Silverman, 2004). Their thorough due diligence process, sophisticated86
contracting, and selection criteria allow entrepreneurs to receive the financing, which they87
could not obtain from other sources (Macmillan et al., 1985; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;88
Brander et al., 2002; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Kaplan and89
Strömberg, 2004). It has been observed that VC-backed firms show superior performance90
with respect to their non-VC-backed peers (Cochrane, 2005; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005;91
Korteweg and Sørensen, 2010). However, this may be an artifact of venture capital investors’92
selection process or of a self-selection of potentially best targets into very reputable and93
experienced venture capital investors (Hsu, 2004; Sørensen, 2007). If this conjecture holds,94
it is then straightforward that venture capital financing would have the same effect on any95
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firm, which is comparable to the eventual VC-backed one prior the investment.96
Yet, a substantial literature asserts that venture capital investors are actively involved97
in the ventures they fund. It is this involvement, which significantly enhances the value of98
the venture after the initial investment (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and Lerner,99
2001, 2004; Bottazzi et al., 2008b). More specifically, investors’ involvement may impact100
on several functional mechanisms in portfolio firms.101
First, it may affect the ways products are produced or sold. VCs actively partici-102
pate in the board of directors of their portfolio firms (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Gorman103
and Sahlman, 1989). They closely monitor and control their targets, which provides ad-104
ditional information about the development of their investments, asserts the managerial105
discipline, incentives realignment. Obviously, this protects investors from managerial moral106
hazard problems and significantly reduces wasteful expenditures (Jensen and Meckling,107
1976; Gompers, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Cumming and Johan, 2008). Their108
participation also implies provision of advisory services to the entrepreneurs (Cumming109
and Johan, 2008), including managerial, strategic, and marketing advices (Sapienza, 1992;110
Sapienza et al., 1994). Besides operational and strategic management, VCs may help their111
portfolio companies with finding appropriate professional senior executives, especially when112
entrepreneurs themselves lack skills in key areas of management (Hellmann and Puri, 2002;113
Bottazzi et al., 2008b). Last but not least, venture’s development can be facilitated by the114
access to the VCs’ developed networks of business advisors, lawyers, suppliers, potential115
clients, customers, and partners (Hochberg et al., 2007; Cumming and Johan, 2008). At116
the investee’s operational level this may translate into more adequate cost structure and117
increased revenues from operations.118
Second, it may influence the underlying portfolio firm’s capital structure and financing119
choices at and after the initial capital injection. Prior to the investment, high uncertainty,120
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potential for agency problems, and little tangibility of assets, which may serve as collat-121
eral, considerably limit the range of possible financing sources (Gompers and Lerner, 2001;122
de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; de Bettignies, 2008). In this sense, venture capital financ-123
ing serves as a viable alternative to the bank capital. Depending on the instrument used by124
the venture capitalist to channel funds into the venture4, post-investment capital structure125
of the underlying portfolio firm may experience some changes (Cumming, 2005; Hellmann,126
2006). In addition, the arrival of venture capitalist also sends a strong positive signal about127
the quality of the venture and its future prospects to external fund providers (Meggin-128
son and Weiss, 1991; Baeyens and Manigart, 2003; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Gompers129
and Lerner, 2004; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2009). Venture capitalist’s involvement130
further facilitates negotiations and contracting for additional financing with third parties131
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Baeyens and Manigart, 2003). Finally, contracts between132
VCs and entrepreneurs coerce additional discipline in the nature, sources, and uses of sub-133
sequent funds raised from third parties (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003, 2004). It is therefore134
plausible to assume that financing decisions by entrepreneurial firms could be more opti-135
mal and tailored to the needs of the underlying firm in comparison to the firms without136
VC-backing.137
Third, venture capitalists typically invest in innovative ventures in new and highly-138
dynamic industries (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). To provide139
proper guidance to such firms, venture capital managers need significant previous experi-140
ence both as venture investor, as industry player, and sometimes as entrepreneur (Bottazzi141
et al., 2008b). Not surprisingly, many top VC managers have previous consulting and en-142
trepreneurial experience (Knockaert et al., 2006). This experience may help VCs better143
4The literature suggests that traditional instruments are convertible securities, like convertible preferred
equity (Sahlman, 1990; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Hellmann, 2006). Some
scholars argue, however, that this conjecture is particular to the US venture capital industry and need not
hold in other countries (see for example Cumming (2005)).
8
understand and develop appropriate (re)actions to the changes in the underlying mar-144
ket/industry conditions. Scholars documented that human capital characteristics of VCs145
help reducing the failure rate of the portfolio firms (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). It has146
also been shown that VC’s involvement affects underlying portfolio firm’s strategic choices147
in terms of product market strategies (Hellmann and Puri, 2000). It is therefore straight-148
forward to assume that VC-backed firms will further benefit from changes in respective149
industry conditions in comparison to their non-VC-backed peers.150
The foregoing mechanisms are directly related to the regular financial performance151
of the portfolio firms. The selection argument, however, implies that VC-backed firms152
should be indistinguishable from their non-VC-backed peers as long as their comparability153
is asserted. This means that changes in these factors will affect the performance of both154
type of entrepreneurial firms in the same way, which leads to the following hypotheses:155
H1a: Financial performance of VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed peers will156
be affected in the same way by the changes in the operating cycle in these firms.157
H2a: Financial performance of VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed peers will158
be affected in the same way by the changes in the capital structure in these firms.159
H3a: Financial performance of VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed peers will160
be affected in the same way by the changes in the external environment around these161
firms.162
The value-adding arguments suggest that operations of VC-backed firms are more ef-163
ficient5, and that financing and strategic decisions are more appropriate to the dynamic164
environment around these firms. Under such structure, we may expect VC-backed firm’s165
performance to react faster to the changes in these factors in comparison to the non-VC-166
backed peers. This discussion leads to the following set of alternative hypotheses:167
H1b: Financial performance of VC-backed firms will be more sensitive to the changes168
in the operating cycle compared to non-VC-backed firms.169
5Even if the efficiency is not an objective, we may expect that VC’s involvement still benefit the operating
process in terms of cost-reductions and value enhancements.
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H2b: Financial performance of VC-backed firms will be more sensitive to the changes170
in the capital structure compared to non-VC-backed firms.171
H3b: Financial performance of VC-backed firms will be more sensitive to the changes172
in the corresponding external environment compared to the non-VC-backed firms.173
3 Method and data174
The test of the foregoing hypotheses is directly related to the selection and value-adding175
arguments proposed in the literature. Separating the two is a very challenging task. Be-176
cause of the selection, venture capital financing becomes endogenous to performance, which177
inflates the values of parameters of performance factors. Include value-adding activities into178
the picture, and the effect of the performance factors could be even more exaggerated. The179
classical solution to the endogeneity problem is the instrumental variable (IV) approach.180
However, Sørensen (2007) argues that IV requires appropriate (exogenous and relevant)181
instruments, which are not readily available for analysis in the venture capital context.182
Instead, he suggests to estimate a structural model, similar to the two-stage Heckman’s183
selection models (Heckman, 1976, 1979). This approach makes use of a selection equation,184
which, in turn, requires observable information on the investor characteristics. In our case,185
the latter are not available, thus we need an alternative solution.186
The procedure devised for testing the proposed conjectures is based on the simulation187
method. We use two types of datasets, which we call main sample (MS) and peer groups188
(PG). The construction of each of the samples is described below.189
3.1 Sample construction190
The empirical setting of this paper is the Belgian venture capital industry during the period191
1998-2007. We use a list of 1,050 Belgian companies that received venture capital financ-192
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ing (only the first injection dates are available) during the mentioned period.6 This list193
comes from various secondary sources, which include Factiva search engine, news archives,194
venture capital funds’ annual reports, various press releases, newsletters, and announce-195
ments. In order to ensure the validity of the observation units, we manually cross-checked,196
whenever possible, each entry between the mentioned sources and the VentureEconomics197
and/or ZEPHYR databases.7 Each entry of the raw data contain information on the date198
of financing round and the target company’s national identification number. Using this199
number we are able to extract firm-specific data from the BELFIRST database. The latter200
include complete annual financial reports (over the specified period) as well as the indus-201
trial sector codes (NACE-BEL 2008 21 class), and the firms’ creation dates.8 Excluding202
unusable observations, VC-backed investments in the financial and real estate sectors, man-203
agement buyout deals, and listed companies, we obtain a main sample (MS) of 990 firms204
that had received venture capital financing. Finally, we use the data from National Insti-205
tute of Statistics on the total assets in each industry present in the sample (NACE-BEL 21206
class) during the specified period.207
Peer groups (PG) are constructed in several steps, following the matching procedure208
suggested by Megginson and Weiss (1991), Lerner (1999), and Manigart et al. (2002).209
First, for each VC-backed firm in the sample we record the values of total assets and total210
revenues in the year immediately prior to the venture capital injection.9 Next, using NACE-211
BEL 2008 21 class codes (3 digits), each VC-backed firm in the MS is matched with its212
respective industry. Basing on the amounts of total assets and total revenues, noted earlier,213
6It is worth noting that this list is all we have as an initial input. Unfortunately, we do not possess
any information regarding the investor or the deal, e.g., the valuation, the number of subsequent financing
rounds, the investor type, the syndication, etc.
7The coverage of Belgian venture capital deals in these databases is far from complete.
8All companies in Belgium, regardless their listing status or size, are obliged to file complete financial
statements with the National Bank of Belgium. They are next compiled into the commercially available
BELFIRST electronic database.
9For start-ups, we took the corresponding values in the injection year.
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we identify to which empirical decile of the corresponding industry each VC-backed firm214
belongs. Finally, we create a PG, set, which consists of all firms from the same industry215
decile as the underlying portfolio firm, plus all firms from the following and preceding216
deciles. The reason to take three deciles is that, sometimes, industrial sectors are too small;217
the number of firms in the decile may bee too limited to qualify for a usable peer group.10218
Thus, for each portfolio firm in the MS there is a corresponding PG, which includes all219
firms from the same industrial sector with a comparable levels of total assets and total220
revenues prior/in the year this portfolio firm had received VC financing. These PGs are221
assumed to represent the sub-populations of potential targets that might have received the222
venture capital backing. The size of peer groups vary from 12 to 6869 firms, depending on223
the industry sector of the corresponding VC-backed firm.224
3.2 Permutation procedure design225
The procedure is designed to randomly create a control sample (CS) from the combination226
of the MS and the PGs. For this, we first generate a random integer R111, which indicates227
the number of firms of the MS to be replaced by the firms coming from the PGs. Next, a228
pair of random integers (R2i and R3i , i = 1, ..., R1) are simultaneously created R1 times.12229
Each R2i serves as an identifier of the VC-backed firm from MS to be replaced by one of the230
firms from its corresponding PG. To ensure that the same MS-firm is not replaced twice,231
R2i are nonrecurrent for all i. Each R3i identifies a firm from the PG, corresponding to the232
current VC-backed firm with the identifier R2i . Note that many of the VC-backed firms in233
the MS may come from the same industrial sectors. This does not necessarily imply that234
their PGs are identical, although, it is technically possible. There may be cases when PGs235
10If a portfolio firm belongs to the first or the last decile of its industry, only following or preceding deciles
respectively are taken.
11All random integers here are generated assuming the uniform distributions.
12Note that R3i depends on the size of the PG corresponding to R2i .
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are overlapping as well. Moreover, R3i itself can be recurrent. In all these cases, a same236
firm from the PGs may be selected multiple times to enter the CS. In such particular cases,237
we control for the national identification number of that firm and, if necessary, regenerate238
R3i . This kind of randomized permutation ultimately provides the CS. It consists of a mix239
of VC-backed firms and their comparable peers that could have been financed by VC, but240
operated without it.241
3.3 Variables and simulation structure242
Financial performance of the VC-backed firms and their peers is measured annually as243
a ratio of free cash flow over shareholders equity. To avoid the causality problems, all244
independent variables are one year lagged.245
To test if there is an effect of the VC’s presence on the operating cycle of an underlying246
portfolio firm, we use an annual ratio of value added over total assets. This measure takes247
into consideration the efficiency in the cost structure of the portfolio firm and its sales248
capacity. It has been shown that financial performance is directly affected by the efficiency249
(Bottazzi et al., 2008a). In the context of this analysis, we expect a positive relationship250
between this factor and financial performance.251
To test if there is an effect of the VC’s presence on the subsequent capital structure252
and financing choices of an underlying portfolio firm, we use an annual equity ratio, defined253
as shareholders equity over total assets. This measure takes into consideration the capital254
structure and size effects (Ooghe and Wymeersch, 2006). According to the capital structure255
and financing choice theories (Myers and Majluf, 1984; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira,256
2009; Vanacker and Manigart, 2010) financial performance is expected to be negatively257
affected by the increases in equity.258
To test if there is an effect of the VC’s presence on the sensitivity of portfolio firm’s259
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return to the changes in external environment, we compute the industrial growth rates260
(annual log change of the total industrial assets). We assume that young and developing261
industries would have more volatile growth rates (Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Klepper, 1997;262
Klepper and Simons, 2005). Returns are expected to be positively affected by the changes263
in this variable. The sectors are aggregated using the first three digits of the NACE-BEL264
code. This ensures the consistency with MS-PG matching procedure, which is also based265
on the three digit correspondence.266
Several additional controls are also included. According to Ooghe et al. (2006) and267
Bottazzi et al. (2008a), there are four dimensions crucial to the financial situation of the268
company: profitability, liquidity, financial structure, and added value. We use four sup-269
plementary measures of liquidity, one measure of financial structure, and one measure of270
profitability. Also, we control our model for the dividends payouts. Three explicit con-271
trol variables are used to account for the firm’s age (log of the age, measured in years272
since creation, AGE), for the number of employees (log of the number of employees in273
each year, EMPL), and for the year in which the venture capital injection takes place274
(dummy variable that takes the value of one from the moment of the arrival of VC on-275
wards, INJY EARDUM).13 Following tables report the definitions of the variables used276
in the analysis, their basic statistics and the correlation matrix.277
TABLE 1 & 2 HERE278
Foregoing hypotheses are tested with the help of regression methods, equivalent to the279
ones used in Alperovych and Hübner (2011). To account for the serial correlation14 in280
13Some companies in the sample show zero values of AGE and EMPL. AGE is 0 if a company is
venture backed from inception. We force NA initial value for the AGE in such cases. EMPL may take the
value of 0 when company does not employ staff in the legal sense, e.g., contract workers with the status
"independent". We add 1 to the EMPL variable to force the existence of logs.
14We checked for the partial correlations with lags (Ljung-Box Q-stat) as well as for the presence of the
14
variables, we first set a basic autoregressive empirical model:281
CF_Ei, t = Ci + δCF_Ei, t−1 + i, t (1)
where subscripts t and i denote the time and company, respectively. Second, the residuals282
of the Equation (1) are used as the response variable to control for the dependency between283
the regressors (X) we use in our principal model:284
i, t = γi + γXi, t−1 + ui, t (2)
Finally, we reconfigure the principal model using Equations (1) and (2) such that285
CF_Ei, t+1 = βi + βXi, t + β∗ui, t + vi, t+1 (3)
Equation (3) posits that the future value of the cash flow over equity of a company i depends286
on the current values of regressors.15287
The simulation is structured in the following way. First we estimate the parameters for288
the MS only. Once a CS is finalized, we estimate model on it and store the parameters. After289
that, the current CS is deleted, and we repeat the permutation procedure to recreate a new290
CS and reestimate the model. This resampling is reiterated 10000 times, which yields the291
empirical distributions of the sensitivities of factors discussed in the previous section. We292
believe that such randomized permutation procedure allows the separation of the selection293
effect from the value-adding effect. If we assume that VCs’ presence is of no consequence,294
i.e. only selection matters, then there should be no significant differences between the295
unit roots (Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF Fisher CHI-square, PP Fisher Chi-square) in all series.
Data and tests are available upon request.
15The first loading (βi) represents the cross-section fixed effect constant, followed by the common factor
betas, which are assumed to be constant over time and cross-sections. The term ui, t should be considered
as an independent variable in Equation (3), since its value is determined earlier in Equations (1) and (2).
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sensitivities estimated on the MS-only sample and the the average of sensitivities from the296
simulations. Alternatively, if VCs do bring changes and additional value to their portfolio297
firms, we should observe significant changes in the sensitivities.298
4 Results299
Two distinct specification approaches are used to test the proposed hypotheses. To begin,300
we benefit from the availability of the annual financial data on each portfolio firm to estimate301
the standard panel regressions in each iteration. The results of this approach are discussed302
in the first part of this section. We continue our analysis with the closer examination of303
the left-hand side of specification equation. The rationale and results of this analysis are304
presented in the second part of this section.305
4.1 Panel approach306
Panel regressions are estimated in three steps following the specifications of Eq. (1) - (3)307
with robust standard errors and cross-section fixed effects. Table 3 reports the results. First,308
consider the MS estimates. The sensitivities of equity ratio (E_TA), value added over309
assets (V A_TA), and industrial growth rate (∆(LOGIND)) are statistically significant310
and consistent with the sign predictions. A unit increase in the equity ratio, which is311
equivalent to raising the relative amounts of equity in the firm, reduces future financial312
performance by about 0.281 units. Second, the sensitivity of the operating cycle efficiency313
has a positive, as expected, and significant effect on the future performance. A unit increase314
of the value added over assets yields about 3.6% increase in the future free cash flow over315
equity of the underlying portfolio firm. Finally, positive and statistically significant effect is316
verified for the industrial growth rate. In this case, a unit growth in the industrial assets, the317
proxy for the dynamics of external environment, increases the future financial performance318
16
by about one thirds.319
TABLE 3 HERE320
The right-hand side of the table reports the results of the MC simulation. First, note321
that the simulated distributions16 of the main variables are non-normal. Conventional322
Jarque-Bera tests (not reported in the table) reject the null hypothesis of normality in323
all cases. All distributions appear to be non-centered, skewed and leptokurtic (see Figure324
1). Next, consider the main point of the simulations, namely, the substantial differences325
between the averages of the simulated distributions and the MS estimates. Figure 1 provides326
a clear visual representation. Table 4 reports the formal tests of the differences between327
the simulated means and the MS estimates.328
FIGURE 1 & TABLE 4 HERE329
The MS estimate of the operating cycle (V A_TA) variable is more pronounced (0.036330
vs. 0.029) and statistically different from the simulated mean, leading to the support of331
H1b (and the rejection of H1a). The size of the implied difference indicates that the VC’s332
presence in the equity of the entrepreneurial firm translates in about 24.14% improvements333
in the efficiency of the operating cycle. This is quite remarkable, especially considering that334
our matching procedure aims at ensuring that non-VC-backed firms are as comparable to335
the VC-backed ones as possible. Although the efficiency of the operating cycle might not336
be the objective in early-stage ventures, the VC value-adding efforts in monitoring, control,337
and managerial advice may still result in optimizations in the operating cycle.338
16For convenience, we use terms "simulated mean", "simulated average", "mean of the simulated distri-
bution" and "average of the simulated distribution" interchangeably.
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The MS estimate of the capital structure (EA_TA) variable shows some unexpected339
results. First, it appears to be greater than the simulated mean (-0.281 vs. -0.300). Second,340
the implied difference of about 6.3% is significant (see Table 4). This structure suggests341
that future increases in the financial performance due to reductions in equity are more342
pronounced when VC is not present in the firm. In other words, non-VC-backed firms343
benefit more from the increases in debt levels compared to their VC-backed peers. This344
suggests the rejection of H2a. Concerning the H2b, however, some clarification might be345
necessary. Specifically, VC-backed firms may be more levered than their non-VC-backed346
peers. In a study of the dynamic financing strategies of the Belgian VC-backed firms,347
Baeyens and Manigart (2003) indicate that VC-backed firms have significantly greater debt348
levels in comparison to their non-VC-backed peers. According to the traditional capital349
structure theory, the debt has the marginally decreasing effect (Myers and Majluf, 1984;350
Frank and Goyal, 2007). Consequently, a unit increase of debt in the non-VC-backed firm351
may result in a more substantial increases in the future financial performance, compared352
to the VC-backed firms. This seems to be more consistent with the simulation results.353
Moreover, this suggests some nonlinear effects of the capital structure variable, which are354
tested in the following section. We will come back to the H2b after these analyses.355
Finally, the MS estimate of the industrial growth rate (∆(LOGIND)) variable is, as356
expected, much greater (0.322 vs. 0.171) and statistically significant from the simulated357
mean, supporting the H3b. The implied difference is as high as 88.33%, suggesting that VC-358
backed firms react much faster to the changes in the underlying industry conditions. If we359
regard the implied difference as the effect of VC’s presence, hence, of the value-adding and360
monitoring activities, this suggests the substantial benefits of the venture capital financing.361
On balance the results seem to be in line with our discussion on the incremental impact362
of VC financing due to value-adding. An alternative explanation, namely, the selection363
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hypothesis suggests that VCs just select better companies (Baum and Silverman, 2004;364
Sørensen, 2007). If that is the case, then the seemingly superior performance of the VC-365
backed firms should be replicated by their comparable non-VC-backed peers. Therefore,366
the sensitivities of returns to the changes of the corresponding determinants should be367
indistinguishable for both VC-backed firms and their peers. Following our results, we posit368
that selection is highly unlikely to be a main factor for the VC performance.369
4.2 Quantile approach370
Our previous discussion of the H2b pointed out on the possible nonlinear relationship be-371
tween the factors affecting financial performance and the performance itself. Why should372
we expect such a relationship? According to a recent and growing stream of literature, the373
growth of small firms is nonlinear in its determinants (Landajo et al., 2008). For exam-374
ple, Jovanovic (1982) suggests firm’s growth diminishes with its age, while other studies375
show that a firm’s growth diminishes with size (Serrasqueiro et al., 2009). Bottazzi et al.376
(2008a) argue that growth influences financial performance, and we have already discussed377
that VC-backed firms are characterized by high growth opportunities. Therefore, we might378
detect a nonlinearity in the firm-specific factors of financial performance as well.379
In a more general way, VC-backed firm may be viewed as a portfolio of growth options380
(Trigeorgis, 1999). Some of these options are straightforward. Others are activated only381
upon realization some prerequisites - options themselves. For example, impressive returns382
on investment in a biotech firm could be triggered if this firm successfully passes all necessary383
clinical trials. In addition to the main objective of research, the R&D process may yield384
some spillover results as well. In this context, the role of VCs is twofold. First they385
are able to detect these options (selection) and stipulate/accelerate their execution (value-386
adding). Thus, because of these option-like characteristics we may observe a nonlinearity387
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of the financial performance in its determinants in general. And in the VC-backed firm388
case, because of selection and value-adding, we may expect this nonlinearity be further389
exaggerated.390
To detect and test this conjecture we use quantile regression models, coined by Koenker391
and Basset (1978). These models were designed to detect nonlinearities without truncating392
the samples. Instead of estimating the conditional mean function (as in least squares),393
quantile regression models estimate the conditional quantile function.17 The models are394
always estimated for the pre-specified quantile of the performance distribution. Hence, if we395
are interested in the effect of V A_TA, E_TA, and ∆(LOGIND) in the most performing396
firms, we specify and estimate the parameters for the 0.9th quantile over the complete397
sample, and not over the firms in this quantile only. The interpretation of the estimated398
parameters is straightforward.18 The use of quantile regression in a simulation setting399
allows the isolation of the VC’s presence effect with respect to the empirical quantiles of400
the financial performance distribution.401
Table 5 reports the results of the simulation with the quantile regression approach.402
As in the preceding section, we reproduce the MS estimates of the model specification403
performed on the VC-backed firms only. For succinctness, we report the results for the404
main variables only.19 Standard parametric (t− test) and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney-405
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) were applied to all variables. The resulting simulated means406
are significantly different from the original estimates in all cases.407
TABLE 5 & FIGURES 2, 3, and 4 HERE408
Panel A and Figure 2 show the results for the equity ratio. The means of the simu-409
17For example a median regression is a particular case of quantile regression when the dependent variable
is conditional median.
18For more details, see preceding chapter and Koenker and Basset (1978) & Koenker and Hallock (2001).
19The estimates of the simulated distributions for control variables are available upon request.
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lated parameter distributions vary from 0.004 (τ = 0.1) to about -0.404 (τ = 0.9). The410
distributions themselves are skewed and leptokurtic. In line with our previous discussion411
of H2b, the simulated means exceed MS estimates in all cases. The penalizing effect of412
under-leverage increases over the quantile of performance, i.e. the difference between the413
MS estimate and simulated mean is growing. The effect of the capital structure on the414
future performance can be considered as linear in the corresponding quantiles. For the415
example, the results for the last quantile (τ = 0.9) suggest that future returns of the most416
performing VC-backed firms are much more sensitive to the changes in the firm’s capital417
structure than the returns of comparable firms, again in line with H2b. Specifically, for418
the VC-backed firm from the top quantile of the financial performance distribution, a unit419
increase of equity reduces future returns by -0.498 units. We observe the same patterns420
in the simulated means, however the magnitude is not as pronounced as in the VC-backed421
firm case.422
Panel B and Figure 3 show the results for the value added over assets variable. MS423
estimates and simulated means of the quantile process follow a somewhat growing pattern.424
For both MS estimates and the simulated means, the effect of the operating cycle efficiency425
is negative in the lowest quantiles, and positive in the highest quantiles of the distribution.426
Simulated means switch sign around the median of the distribution, whereas MS estimates427
do so after the fourth quantile (τ = 0.4). The differences between the simulated means428
and MS estimates are partially in line with the H1b. This is because the positive impact429
of the VC’s presence is strongly observable in the middle of the distribution, in the fifth-430
to-seventh quantiles. To give an example, MS estimations show that the coefficient of the431
value added over assets variable is negative (-0.027) and lower than the simulated mean432
(-0.018) for the least performing firms (bottom quantile, τ = 0.1). Simulated means show433
that in the top quantiles of the distribution a unit increase of the value added over assets434
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ratio yields about 2.4% increase in the future financial performance. In the case of VC-435
backed firm, this increase is about 2.0%. The MS estimate however, is always greater436
than the simulated mean between the third and seventh quantile. The difference between437
the simulated means and MS estimates seem to converge towards the top quantile of the438
performance distribution. On balance, this structure suggests several considerations. First,439
because of the very narrow difference between the simulated means and MS estimates in440
the top quantile, VC’s presence in the equity of the underlying portfolio firm does not seem441
to affect operating cycle efficiency much. This may happen because VC-backed firms and442
their peers are very close in terms of optimization of their operating cycles. Second, VC’s443
presence does make portfolio firm react faster to the changes in operating cycle, if the firm444
is in the middle of the performance distribution. Third, the bottom quantiles suggest that445
VC’s presence slightly reduces the sensitivity of financial performance to the changes in the446
operating cycle. The last two parts may be related to the findings on the VC’s involvement.447
Specifically, the literature suggests that VCs spend more effort on the ventures, which are448
already performing well (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1994, 1996), forcing the greater449
negative effect of the VC’s presence in the bottom quantiles. Finally, the negative values450
of the sensitivities in these quantiles are probably related to the fact that, at this cash-451
burn stage of firm’s development, reaching the optimum in the production efficiency is not452
beneficial. In any case, it appears that value-creation in the VC-backed firms is not rooted453
in the optimization of the operating cycle.454
Panel C and Figure 4 report the results for the industry growth rate variable. It follows,455
that in the lowest quantiles (τ ∈ [0.1; 0.4]) the average impact of the industry related456
variable is negative, and that it switches its sign in the following quantiles. Original MS457
estimates are negative and lower than the simulated means in the first quantile, but turn458
positive and greater then simulated means in all subsequent quantiles. VC-backed firms459
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seem to react much faster to the changes in the industrial dynamics in comparison to the460
simulated means. The impact of the industrial growth rate on future performance of the461
most performing VC-backed firms (τ = 0.9) is the highest in comparison to their non-VC-462
backed peers (0.552 vs. 0.360). This difference seems to be greater in the outer quantiles463
(τ ∈ [0.1; 0.3] and τ ∈ [0.7; 0.9]), and moderate in the middle quantiles. This suggests that464
the magnification effect of the presence of the VC is more pronounced in the low performing465
and high performing firms. This structure is in line with H3b, and implies that VC-backed466
firms are able to extract considerable value from the dynamics of external environment.467
On balance, we observe that VC presence in the company amplifies the portfolio firm’s468
reaction to the changes in the capital structure and in the industry dynamics. To a lesser469
extent the same conclusion can be applied to the operating cycle efficiency variable.470
5 Concluding remarks471
This paper explores the incremental impact of the venture capital financing in the simula-472
tion setting. Specifically, we examine whether the regular financial returns of VC-backed473
firms are due to self-selection (Sørensen, 2007) or value-adding. We draw our assumptions474
following the insights of venture capital literature on the three determinants of financial475
performance: operating cycle efficiency, capital structure/financing choices, and dynamics476
of the industry. Consequently, we build our main assumption that the presence of the477
venture capitalist in the equity of the firm exaggerates the impact of these factors. Using478
the complex sample construction procedure, three-step regression method and two different479
estimation approaches, we are able to quantify the magnitude of these shifts. The central480
findings can be summarized as follows.481
First, the traditional regression approach points out that venture capital-backed firms482
are able to extract more rent from the changing industry conditions, and to an extent from483
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the operating cycle optimization. The sensitivity of the financial returns of VC-backed firms484
to the changes in these factors is always greater than it is in comparable firms. It seems that485
because of the generally higher leverage levels in the VC-backed firms, the sensitivity of the486
regular financial returns to the changes in capital structure seem to be lower in VC-backed487
firms, than in their comparable peers. However, this evidence is directly related to the488
nonlinear relationship between the financial return and its determinants. In this context, our489
second finding suggests that capital structure, or financing choices, and industry dynamics490
are the main sources of return generation in VC-backed firms. In both cases, such firms491
react faster and stronger to the changes in these factors in comparison to the sensitivities492
of their non-VC-backed peers. This is especially relevant to the most performing firms, as493
the sensitivity of their returns seem to be the highest. Underperforming firms still benefit494
from VC’s presence, however, the effect decays with performance. Concerning the operating495
cycle efficiency, we find the weak evidence that returns of average performing VC-backed496
firms react slightly faster to the changes in operating cycle, whereas the difference is almost497
negligible in the most performing firms (both VC-backed and non-VC-backed ones).498
One of the implications of this study is that we are able to measure and test the impact499
of the VC presence on the determinants of firm’s regular performance at a company level.500
Moreover, our findings indirectly support the value-adding hypothesis of venture perfor-501
mance, consistent with the traditional literature (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Brander et al.,502
2002; Wood and Wright, 2009). The simulation procedure allows us to overcome to an503
extent the selection bias issues (Manigart et al., 2002; Bottazzi et al., 2008b), when the in-504
strumental variable and/or structural models are difficult to implement. Finally, our results505
point out the possibility that value-adding by venture capital investor is mainly concen-506
trated in the capital structure decisions and the decisions linked with strategic management507
advise.508
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Some future developments in this direction are possible. For example, due to the nature509
of our data, we are unable to control directly for the VC’s type, experience, reputation, and510
level of involvement. Consequently, it is impossible to test whether a particular investor, a511
more experienced, or reputable one, is associated with specific areas of firm performance.512
For example, captive venture capitalists related to banks and other financial institutions513
may put more emphasis on the financing choices and capital structure optimization in the514
portfolio firms. Alternatively, investors experienced in a particular industry may better515
affect the way portfolio firms integrate in their respective industries. This, in turn, could516
explain why, in some cases, the presence of VC is beneficial, and in others is only marginal.517
Our analysis assumed constant effects of the return determinants over time, hence the518
differences in sensitivities of VC-backed firms and their peers are set to be stable. It is519
however plausible to assume that comparable firms may show some convergence to the520
VC-backed firms in a longer time horizon. The analysis of this structure, however, would521
require much larger sample that we currently have.522
25
References523
Alperovych, Y. and Hübner, G. (2011). Explaining returns on venture capital backed companies: evidence524
from Belgium. Research in International Business and Finance, 25(3):277–295.525
Baeyens, K. and Manigart, S. (2003). Dynamic financing strategies: the role of venture capital. The Journal526
of Private Equity, 7(1):50–58.527
Baum, J. A. and Silverman, B. S. (2004). Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, and528
human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups.529
Journal of Business Venturing, 19:411–436.530
Bottazzi, G., Secchi, A., and Tamagni, F. (2008a). Productivity, profitability and financial performance.531
Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(4):711–751.532
Bottazzi, L., da Rin, M., and Hellmann, T. (2008b). Who are the active investors? Evidence from venture533
capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 89:488–512.534
Brander, J. A., Amit, R., and Antweiler, W. (2002). Venture-capital syndication: improved venture selection535
vs. the value-added hypothesis. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 11(3):423–452.536
Cochrane, J. H. (2005). The risk and return of venture capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 75:3–52.537
Cornelli, F. and Yosha, O. (2003). Stage financing and the role of convertible securities. Review of Economic538
Studies, 70:1–32.539
Cumming, D., Fleming, G., and Suchard, J.-A. (2005). Venture capitalist value-added activities, fundraising540
and drawdowns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29:295–331.541
Cumming, D. and Johan, S. (2008). Information asymmetries, agency costs and venture capital exit out-542
comes. Venture Capital, 10(3):197–231.543
Cumming, D. J. (2005). Capital structure in venture finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11:550–585.544
Davila, A. and Foster, G. (2003). Staging venture capital: empirical evidence on the differential roles of545
early versus late rounds. Working paper.546
de Bettignies, J.-E. (2008). Financing the entrepreneurial venture. Management Science, 54(1):151–166.547
de Bettignies, J.-E. and Brander, J. A. (2007). Financing entrepreneurship: bank finance versus venture548
capital. Journal of Business Venturing, 22:808–832.549
de Clercq, D. and Manigart, S. (2007). The venture capital post-investment phase: opening the black box550
of involvement, in "Handbook of research on venture capital", chapter 7, pages 193–218. Edward Elgar551
Publishing Inc.552
Dimov, D. P. and Shepherd, D. A. (2005). Human capital theory and venture capital firms: exploring553
"home runs" and "strike outs". Journal of Business Venturing, 20:1–21.554
Frank, M. Z. and Goyal, V. K. (2007). Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt. Working paper.555
Gompers, P. (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. Journal of556
Finance, 50:1461–1490.557
26
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (1996). The use of convenants: an empirical analysis of venture partnership558
agreements. Journal of Law and Economics, 39(2):463–498.559
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2001). The venture capital revolution. Journal of Economic Perspectives,560
15(2):145–168.561
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2004). Venture capital cycle. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,562
London, England, 2 edition.563
Gorman, M. and Sahlman, W. A. (1989). What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business Venturing,564
4(4):231–248.565
Hand, J. R. (2007). Determinants of the round-to-round returns to pre-IPO venture capital investments in566
U.S. biotechnology companies. Journal of Business Venturing, 22:1–28.567
Heckman, J. J. (1976). The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and568
Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models in "Annals of Economic and Social569
Measurement", volume 5, pages 120–137. NBER.570
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1):153–161.571
Hellmann, T. (1998). The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts. RAND Journal of572
Economics, 29(1):57–76.573
Hellmann, T. (2006). IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital. Journal574
of Financial Economics, 81:649–679.575
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M. (2000). The interaction between product market and financing strategy: the576
role of venture capital. Review of Financial Studies, 13(4):959–984.577
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: empirical578
evidence. Journal of Finance, 57(1):169–197.579
Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., and Lu, Y. (2007). Whom you know matters: venture capital networks580
and investment performance. Journal of Finance, 62(1):251–301.581
Hsu, D. H. (2004). What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation? Journal of Finance,582
59(4):1805–1844.583
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and584
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305–360.585
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Selection and evolution of the industry. Econometrica, 50(3):649–670.586
Kaplan, S. N. and Schoar, A. (2005). Private equity performance: returns, persistence, and capital flows.587
Journal of Finance, 60(4):1791–1822.588
Kaplan, S. N. and Strömberg, P. (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: and empirical589
analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 70:281–315.590
Kaplan, S. N. and Strömberg, P. (2004). Characteristics, contracts, and actions: evidence from venture591
capitalist analyses. Journal of Finance, 59(5):2177–2210.592
Klepper, S. (1997). Industry life cycles. Industrial and Corporate Change, 6(1):145–181.593
27
Klepper, S. and Graddy, E. (1990). The evolution of new industries and the determinants of market594
structure. RAND Journal of Economics, 21(1):27–44.595
Klepper, S. and Simons, K. L. (2005). Industry shakeouts and technological change. Journal of Industrial596
Organization, 23:23–43.597
Knockaert, M., Lockett, A., Clarysse, B., and Wright, M. (2006). Do human capital and fund characteristics598
drive follow-up behaviour of early stage high-tech vcs? International Journal of Technology Management,599
34(1/2):7–27.600
Koenker, R. and Basset, G. (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica, 46(1):33–50.601
Koenker, R. and Hallock, K. F. (2001). Quantile regression. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4):141–602
156.603
Korteweg, A. and Sørensen, M. (2010). Risk and return characteristics of venture capital-backed en-604
trepreneurial companies. Review of Financial Studies, 23(10):3738–3772.605
Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (2000). Assessing the contribution of venture capital to innovation. RAND606
Journal of Economics, 31(4):674–692.607
Landajo, M., Andrès, J., and Lorca, P. (2008). Measuring firm performance by using linear and non-608
parametric quantile regressions. Applied Statistics, 57(2):227–250.609
Lerner, J. (1999). The government as venture capitalist: the long-run impact of the SBIR program. Journal610
of Business, 72(3):285–318.611
López-Gracia, J. and Sogorb-Mira, F. (2009). Testing trade-off and pecking order theories financing SMEs.612
Small Business Economics, 31:117–136.613
Macmillan, I. C., Kulow, D. M., and Khoylian, R. (1989). Venture capitalists’ involvement in their invest-614
ments: extent and performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 4(1):27–47.615
Macmillan, I. C., Siegel, R., and Subbanarasimha, P. N. (1985). Criteria used by venture capitalists to616
evaluate new venture proposals. Journal of Business Venturing, 1(1):119–128.617
Macmillan, I. C., Zemann, L., and Subbanarasimha, P. (1987). Criteria distinguishing successful from618
unsuccessful ventures in the venture screening process. Journal of Business Venturing, 2(2):123–137.619
Manigart, S., Baeyens, K., and Hyfte, W. V. (2002). The survival of venture capital backed companies.620
Venture Capital, 4(2):103–124.621
Megginson, W. L. and Weiss, K. A. (1991). Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings. Journal622
of Finance, 46(3):879–903.623
Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information624
that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13:187–221.625
Ooghe, H., Laere, E. V., and Langhe, T. D. (2006). Are acquisitions worthwile? An empirical study of the626
post-acquisions performance of privately held belgian companies. Small Business Economics, 27:223–243.627
Ooghe, H. and Wymeersch, C. V. (2006). Traité d’analyse financière. Intersentia, Antwerp.628
28
Sahlman, W. A. (1990). The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations. Journal of Financial629
Economics, 27(2):473–521.630
Sapienza, H. J. (1992). When do venture capitalists add value? Journal of Business Venturing, 7(1):9–27.631
Sapienza, H. J., Amason, A. C., and Manigart, S. (1994). The level and nature of venture capitalist632
involvement in their portfolio companies. Managerial Finance, 20(1):3–17.633
Sapienza, H. J., Manigart, S., and Vermeir, W. (1996). Venture capitalist governance and value added in634
four countries. Journal of Business Venturing, 11:439–469.635
Serrasqueiro, Z., Nunes, P. M., Leitão, J., and da Rocha Armada, M. J. (2009). Are there non-linearities636
between SME growth and their determinants? A quantile approach. Working paper, EFMA 2009 Annual637
Meeting.638
Sørensen, M. (2007). How smart is smart money? A two-sided matching model of venture capital. Journal639
of Finance, 62(6):2725–2762.640
Trigeorgis, L. (1999). Real options. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 4th641
edition.642
Tyebjee, T. T. and Bruno, A. V. (1984). A model of venture capitalist investment activity. Management643
Science, 30(9):1051–1066.644
Vanacker, T. R. and Manigart, S. (2010). Pecking order and debt capacity considerations for high-growth645
companies seeking financing. Small Business Economics, 35:53–69.646
Wood, G. and Wright, M. (2009). Private equity: a review and synthesis. International Journal of Man-647
agement Reviews, 11(4):361–380.648
Wright, M. and Robbie, K. (1998). Venture capital and private equity: a review and synthesis. Journal of649
Business Finance and Accounting, 25(5/6):521–570.650
29
Appendix: tables and figures651
Table 1: Summary of the variables
Variable Description Definition
CF_E (1) Return measure, dependent variable Free cash flow (after taxes) / Book
value of equity
E_TA (2) Company maturity measure, indepen-
dent variable
Book value of equity / Book value of
total assets
LOGIND (3) Industry maturity measure, indepen-
dent variable
Natural log of industrial assets’ value
V A_TA (4) Product maturity measure, indepen-
dent variable
Value added / Book value of total as-
sets
PAY OUT (5) Payout over retention, control variable Dividends distributed / Retained earn-
ings
LIQ (6) Debt servicing ratio, here liquidity ra-
tio, control variable
Debt charges (interest payments) /
EBIT
LOG(AGE) (7) Age of the portfolio company, control
variable
Natural log of the age of the portfolio
firm
LOG(EMPL) (8) Number of employees, control variable Natural log of the number of number
of employees in full time equivalent
INJY EARDUM (9) Dummy for injection year, control vari-
able
1 since injection year onwards, 0 oth-
erwise
ACID (10) Strict liquidity ratio, here acid test,
control variable
(Accounts receivable + treasury place-
ments + cash) / Short term debt
CURRENT_RATIO (11) Current ratio, control variable (Current assets - long term current li-
abilities) / Short term debt
FCF_TF (12) Free cash flow over tier funds, control
variable
Free cash flow after tax / (Deferred
taxes and provisions + Total Debt)
NET_RENT_CA (13) Current assets operating profitability,
control variable
Operating income / Current assets
TRESO_RATIO (14) Treasury ratio, control variable (Treasury placements + cash - short-
term financial debt) /
(Current assets - long-term accounts
receivables)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Panel regressions - formal tests
Variable MS estimate, Mean ∆% H0 : βˆk −Mean = 0 Pr(βk < βˆk)(βˆk) t− test MW-test
E_TAi, t -0.281** -0.300 6.33 *** *** 0.586
V A_TAi, t 0.036** 0.029 24.14 *** *** 0.670
∆(LOGINDi, t) 0.322** 0.171 88.33 *** *** 0.852
The table summarizes the results of two formal tests of the difference between the means of simulated distributions
and the MS estimates. The formal tests are the standard t− test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. ∆% is always computed
with respect to the MS estimate. Last column reports the proportion (empirical probability) of the simulated













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.Mean= 0.171 O.Est= 0.322
Note: The figure reports the simulated distributions of the estimators of the loadings of return determinants.
Dashed lines correspond to the simulated means of the distributions. Solid lines mark the MS original
estimates for the VC-backed sample only.
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Note: The figure reports the simulated distributions of the estimators of the Equity Ratio (E_TA) in the
quantile regression setting. Dashed lines correspond to the simulated means of the distributions. Solid lines
mark the MS estimates of for the VC-backed sample only.
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Figure 3: Quantile regression approach - simulated distributions of the loadings of the





































































































































60 B.Mean : 0.024O.Est : 0.02
Note: The figure reports the simulated distributions of the estimators of the Value-added-over-assets ratio
(V A_TA) in the quantile regression setting. Dashed lines correspond to the simulated means of the
distributions. Solid lines mark the MS estimates of for the VC-backed sample only.
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Figure 4: Quantile regression approach - simulated distributions of the loadings of the




































































































































40 B.Mean : 0.36
O.Est : 0.552
Note: The figure reports the simulated distributions of the estimators of the Industrial growth rate
(∆(LOGIND)) in the quantile regression setting. Dashed lines correspond to the simulated means of
the distributions. Solid lines mark the MS estimates of for the VC-backed sample only.
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